Dwight A. Lucas II, PhD

The Problem

1. - A problem seems to be something raised for inquiry, consideration, or a solution. It appears to be an unjudged question or a thing that is hard to know, understand, or solve. Also, a problem seems to be something that causes angst, turmoil, or anxiety. But what is a problem alone? Some reasons the problem exists are that the problem is put into question, difficult to solve, or causes discomfort. Yet, all these reasons are prior conditions that uphold the popular ideation of the problem. But if such prior conditions are nonexistent, where is the problem?

2. - One might say that, "A problem cannot exist without such preconditions." Well, this would be the case if the problem had a specific number of predictable and predefined preconditions. Such specificity would not allow for undefined and predictable accidentals that do not have characteristics similar to the preconditions presumed prior. And the thing that people might have thought a problem to be, if it had such so-called volatility as characteristics, might be considered a non-problem. Here, one might ask if such a thing as a problem even has a nature.

3. - If a problem seems to be a thing and seems to have specific preconditions, it appears that a problem has a form and process, which develops to become clearer when one identifies antecedents.

4. - Antecedents that must be linked to the will are inextricably subjective. Otherwise, the preconditions that give rise to a problem must be found outside of the will. In this case, we should ask, does the will bring a problem into existence? And have we arrived at a problem?

5. - Nonetheless, if there is a problem, which does not fall under the category of the will and is not held under the power of the will of the one in the dilemma, it seems that another entity presents us with a problem. Whether this is a problem or not—if not dependent on the will of the one in the dilemma—the one in the dilemma confronts the problem in a realm of judgement. Thus, the nature of the problem seems shaped not only by the will of the one in the dilemma or the presenter of the problem, but also by this place of judgement that the problem is placed in. But what is the role of the one in the dilemma or the entity that presents the problem in this space of judgement? Furthermore, how should one view this place of judgement when one considers the modes of presentation regarding the problem?

6. - Is this place of judgement an arena, coliseum, court, field, playground, dream, furnace, or some other area that might typify the conditions and nature of the problem? That is to ask, is this place of judgement a duel, where one is put into a violent contest, where one is confronted with a test or trial, where both have equal or unequal advantages, that is simply feigned, where purging occurs, or some other place?

7. - "Is not this place of judgement called the will or at least the choice?" Well, in one case, it can be called the will or choice, if the one put in the dilemma actually accepts the existence of the problem as such. Still, the one put in this space of judgement, which I call the dilemma, may refuse to choose. This non-choice could be done in a gesture of indifference, superiority, incompetence, fear, or some other gesture that renders the could-be problem insignificant, trivial, futile, too powerful, or some other characteristic. This means the one in the dilemma believes the problem does not deserve a choice. "But is this not a choice? Is not the problem still decided upon, though it's not dealt with directly through an explicit choice? Does not the one in the dilemma make an implicit choice?" That would only be the case if one calls the choice a problem. But where does a problem begin and end?

8. - But I don't have to judge the thing—this dilemma forced upon me—if one wants to call such a thing a problem. Indeed, the thing may be a problem to everyone else but me. Neither naivety nor ignorance has to accompany such a case. The choice not to deal with the problem, so to speak, is not a choice regarding the proposed problem. Nonetheless, the problem maintains its problematic character because it remains in-front or be-fore someone. This means the non-decision made my the one forced in the dilemma averts the problem. "Doesn't this mean the problem still exists?" Well, what is the problem? That is, can another force another to deal with or posess a problem if they refuse? It depends. If, for instance, a person pulls out and points a gun at someone's head and threatens to kill them unless the threatened person dances, where is the problem? Say the threatened person chooses to turn his back and go to sleep at the feet of the one holding the gun. Where is the problem, or has it been solved? Can we say that the sleeping man has a problem? From our observations, a problem for the threatened man is nonexistent. "But did not the man choose death by refusing to dance?" The threatened man chooses neither dancing nor death, but sleep. His choice was indifferent to the forced dilemma. In the dreams of the sleeping man, he is unaware of the problem. "But the problem still exists. The threatened person is just in denial." Is a person in denial if they simply turn their back to a violent problem? If one cannot turn their back to a problem, making it void, the problem becomes an entity always before anyone as soon as it presents itself in-front and be-fore one in the most violent matter.